# Off

## ballot

### 1NC---Ballot Skeleton

#### Links

#### 1 – Ballot – The 1AC’s value stands on its own---responding to it with judgement and the ballot is a hollow validation that siphons off political energy and draws them into the oppressive gaze of the academy---vote Negative to decline affirmation

Phillips 99 – Dr. Kendall R. Phillips, Professor of Communication at Central Missouri State University, PhD in Speech Communication from Pennsylvania State University, MA in Speech Communication from Central Missouri State University, BS in Psychology and Sociology from Southwest Baptist University, “Rhetoric, Resistance, and Criticism: A Response to Sloop and Ono”, Philosophy & Rhetoric, Volume 32, Number 1, p. 96-101

My concern with this movement centers around an issue that Sloop and Ono seem to take as a given, namely, the role of the critic. On one hand, calling for the systematic investigation of existing marginalized discourses is a natural extension both of critical rhetoric (see McKerrow 1989, 1991) and of the general ideological turn in criticism (see Wander 1983). On the other hand, the ease of transition from criticism in the service of resistance to criticism of resistance may obscure the need to address some fundamental issues regarding the general function of rhetorical criticism in an uncertain and contentious world. Beyond licensing the critic to engage in political struggle, Sloop and Ono advocate the pursuit of covert resistant discourses. Such a move not only stretches our understanding of rhetoric and criticism, but also alters significantly the relationship between critic and out- law. Critical interrogation of dominant discursive practices in the service of political/cultural reform is supplanted in favor of positioning covert out- law communities as objects of investigation. Invited to seek out subversive discourses, the critic is positioned as the active agent of change and the out-law discourse becomes merely instrumental. Rather than academic criticism acting in service of everyday acts of resistance, everyday acts of resistance are put into the service of academic criticism. Rhetorical resistance That we are "caught within conflicting logics of justice that are culturally struggled over" (Sloop and Ono 1997, 50) and that rhetoric is employed in these struggles seems an uncontroversial statement. Despite the theoretical miasma surrounding judgment, Sloop and Ono accurately note, the material process of rendering judgments (and of disputing the logics of litigation) continues in the world of actually practiced discourse. In the materially contested world, rhetoric is utilized both by those seeking to secure the grounds of dominant judgment and by those seeking to undermine or supplant dominant cultural logics with some out-law notion of justice. The distinction between these two cultural groups, "in-law" and out- law, however, deserves some consideration prior to any discussion of the role of the critic as implied in the out-law discourse project. The discourse of the dominant or those within the bounds of superordinate logics of litigation is reminiscent of Michel De Certeau's (1984) strategic discourse. For De Certeau, strategies are utilized by those who have authority by virtue of their proper position. Strategies exploit the institutionally guaranteed background consensus by which power relations (and litigations) are maintained and advanced. In contrast, tactics are utilized by those having no proper place of authority within the discursive economy who must seek opportunities whereby the discourse of the dominant might be undermined and contested. To extend Sloop and Ono's definition, out-law discourses are those that can (and, by their analysis, do) take advantage of situations (e.g., race riots) to disrupt the regularity of dominant cultural groups. The ongoing struggle between strategically instituted cultural dominants and the "out-law always lurk[ing] in the distance" (66) is acknowledged, even celebrated, by Sloop and Ono. What their acknowledgment fails to provide, however, is a clear need for critical intervention. Indeed, quite the reverse is presented: It is the critic (particularly the left-leaning critic) who needs out-law discourse. While the struggles over justice, equality, and freedom have gone on, the left-leaning critics are those who have theoretically excluded themselves from the disputes. The study of out-law dis- courses, then, provides a means to reinvigorate the intellectual and re-institute (academic) leftist thinking into popular political struggles (53-54). Thus, Sloop and Ono's project incorporates three types of rhetoric: the rhetoric of the in-law, presumably the traditional object of critical attention; the rhetoric of the out-law, the study of which may transform our understanding of judgment as well as reinvigorate leftist democratic critiques; and the rhetoric of the critics who, having lost their political po- tency, can exploit the discourse of the out-law to promote ideological struggles. It is to this critical rhetoric that I now turn. Resistance criticism Sloop and Ono (1997) clearly state the relationship they envision between the rhetorical critic and out-law discourse: "Ultimately, we will argue that the role of critical rhetoricians is to produce 'materialist conceptions of judgment,' using out-law judgments to disrupt dominant logics of judgment" (54; emphasis added). Here the critic seeks out vernacular discourse (60), focuses on the methods and values embodied in these communities (62), listens to and evaluates the out-law community (62-63), and chooses appropriate discourses for the purpose of disrupting dominant practices (63). Essentially, it is the critic who seeks out marginalized discourses and returns them to the center for the purpose of provoking dominant cultural groups (63). Despite acknowledging the efficacy of out-law discourses, Sloop and Ono assume that the critiques generated and presented by the out-law community have only minimal effect. The irony, and indeed arrogance, of this assumption is evident when they claim: "There are cases, however, when, without the prompting of academic critics, out-law discourses serve local purposes at times and at others resonate within dominant discourses, disrupting sedimented ways of thinking, transforming dominant forms of judgment" (60; emphasis added). Sloop and Ono seem to suggest that such locally generated critiques are the exception, whereas the political efficacy of the academic critic is the rule. This seems an odd claim, given that the justification for their out-law discourse project is the lack of politically viable academic critique and the perceived potency of out-law conceptions of judgment. Their suggestion that out-law communities are in need of the academic critic contradicts not only the already disruptive nature of existing out-law discourses (the grounds for using out-law discourse), but also the impotence of contemporary critical discourse (the warrant for studying out-law discourse). By this I do not mean that the critiques and theories generated by academically instituted intellectuals have not been incorporated into subversive discourses. Just as out-law discourses inevitably mount critiques of dominant logics, so, too, the perspectives on rhetoric and criticism generated by academics are used in resistance movements. Feminist critiques of patriarchy, queer theories of homophobia, postcolonial interrogations of race have found their way into the service of resistant groups. The key distinction I wish to make is that the existence of criticism (academic or self-generated) in resistance does not necessitate Sloop and Ono's move to a criticism of resistance. What Sloop and Ono fail to offer is an adequate argument for "taking public speaking out of the streets and studying it in the classroom, for treating it less as an expression of protest" (Wander 1983, 3) and more as an object for analysis and reproduction within the political economy of the academy. Philip Wander made a similar charge against Herbert Wicheln's early critical project, and this concern should remain at the forefront of any discussion aimed at expanding the scope and function of criticism. Sloop and Ono offer numerous directives for the critic without addressing whether the critic should be examining out-law discourses in the first place. While it is too early to suggest any definitive answer to the question of criticism of resistance, some preliminary arguments as to why critics should not pursue out-law discourses can be offered: (1) Hidden out-law discourses may have good reasons to stay hidden. Sloop and Ono specifically instruct us that "the logic of the out-law must constantly be searched for, brought forth" (66) and used to disrupt dominant practices. But are we to believe that all out-law discourses are prepared to mount such a challenge to the dominant cultural logic? Or, indeed, that the members of out-law communities are prepared to be brought into the arena of public surveillance in the service of reconstituting logics of litigation? It seems highly unlikely that all divergent cultural groups have developed equally, or that all members of these groups share Sloop and Ono's "imperial impulse" (51) to promote their conceptions and practices of justice. (2) Academic critical discourse is not transparent. Here I allude to the overall problem of translation (see Foucault 1994; Lyotard 1988; Lyotard and Thebaud 1985; Zabus 1995) as an extension of the previous concern. Critical discourse cannot become the medium of commensurability for divergent language games. Are we to believe that the "use" of out-law dis- course by critics to disrupt dominant practices can fail to do violence to these diverse/divergent logics? Are out-law discourses merely tools to be exploited and discarded in the pursuit of returning leftist academic dis- course to the center? (3) Perhaps the academic translation of out-law discourse could be true to the internal logic of the out-law community. And, perhaps the re-presentation of out-law logic within the academic community will bestow a degree of legitimacy on the out-law community. Nonetheless, the effect of legitimizing out-law discourse is unknown and potentially destructive. In an effort to siphon the political energy of out-law discourse into academic practice, we may ultimately destroy the dissatisfaction that serves as a cathexis for these out-law discourses. It seems possible that academic recognition might take the place of struggle for material opportunities (see Fraser 1997). But, will academic legitimation create any material changes in the conditions of out-law communities? I mean to suggest, not that it is better to allow the out-law community to suffer for its cause, but rather that incorporating the struggle into an (admittedly) impotent academic critique does not offer a prima facie alternative. (4) Criticism of resistance denies the practical and theoretical importance of opportunity. Returning to De Certeau's notion of tactics, the crucial element of these discursive moves is their use of opportunity to disrupt the proper authority of the dominant. The kairos of intervention provides the key to undermining "in-law" discourses. But when is the "right moment in time" for the academic reproduction of out-law discourse? Mapping the points of resistance (ala Foucault and Biesecker) entails interrogating "in-law" discourses for their incongruities and contradictions, not turning the academic gaze upon those communities waiting for an opportunity. Out-laws do not lurk in the forefront (66), hoping to be exposed by academic critics; they wait for the right moment for their disruption. Rhetoricians can provide rhetorical instructions for seeking opportunities and for exploiting these opportunities (literally making the culturally weaker argument the stronger), but this does not justify interrogating (intervening in) the cultural logics of the marginalized. The concerns raised here are not designed to dismiss Sloop and Ono's provocative essay. The divergent critical logic they outline deserves careful consideration within the critical community, and it is my hope that the concerns I raise may help to further problematize the relationship between resistance and rhetorical criticism. Rhetorical criticism As I have suggested, my purpose is to use the provocative nature of Sloop and Ono's project to extend disputes regarding the ends of rhetorical criticism. Diverging perspectives on the ends of criticism have been categorized by Barbara Warnick (1992) as falling along four general lines: artist, analyst, audience, and advocate. Leah Ceccarelli (1997) discerns similar categories around the aesthetic, epistemic, and political ends of rhetorical criticism. The out-law discourse project presents clear ties to the notion of critic as advocate. For Sloop and Ono, the critic is an interested party, discerning (and at times disputing) the underlying values and forces contained within a discourse. Additionally, however, the out-law discourse critic is an analyst focusing on the hidden, aberrant texts of the out-law and "rendering] an incoherent or esoteric text comprehensible" (Warnick 1992, 233). Now, I am not suggesting that a critic must serve only one function or that the roles of advocate and analyst are mutually exclusive; rather, these entanglings of power (political ends) and knowledge (epistemic ends) are inevitable. My concern is that we not neglect the complexity of these entanglements. Turning covert out-law discourses into objects of our analyses runs the risk of subjecting them both to the gaze of the dominant and to the power relations of the academy. As the works of Michel Foucault (especially 1979, 1980) aptly illustrate, practices presented as extending such noble goals as emancipation and humanity may endow institutions of confinement and objectification. Any justification for studying out-law dis- course because doing so may extend our political usefulness in the pursuit of emancipatory goals must not obscure the already existing power relations authorizing such studies. Our attempts to extend our domains of knowledge and expertise (authority) must not be pursued unreflexively.

#### 2- The use of “map” as a metaphor inherently brings with it a cultural baggage of governability and power that critical uses of the term can’t escape

Brennan-Horley 10, University of Wollongong (Chris, Creative city mapping: experimental applications of gis for cultural planning and auditing, <https://ro.uow.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&httpsredir=1&article=4235&context=theses>

Cartography, GIS and the term ‘mapping’ itself brings with it a particular kind of cultural baggage. Maps remain a vital component of the western knowledge system traceable back to feudal times and have been used by state powers as mechanisms of knowledge production to constitute both subjects and territories as ‘governable’ (Wood 2002, Rose-Redwood 2006). In this tradition, territory is represented through conventions around co-ordinate systems, geo-coding and symbology, all of which Have carried through to the GIS realm. Despite cartography and western mappings being systematically unpacked by cultural geographers as tools for exerting power, they remain imbued with an unquestionable sense of objectiveness, masking other knowledge systems and ways of conveying information about places (Harley 1989, Rose-Redwood 2006). In this thesis, the perceived informational superiority of cartographic maps reproduced via GIS was repeatedly leveraged against as a means for effectively conveying research findings about the creative tropical city project (see section 1.6.1) to stakeholder audiences. These situations are discussed and elaborated in chapters 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7.

#### The baggage imported by the use of a spatial metaphor is that it functions to entrench a territitorialized understanding of space EVEN when it is used in fluid and critical ways

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At the turn of the 21st century, a quick browse through journals or bibliographical databases exposes the proliferation, in the humanities and social sciences, of titles that use the word “mapping.” The applications are varied and suggestive, but the following selection conveys the striking recurrence of this trope: China Off Center: Mapping the Margins of the Middle Kingdom (2002) Cultures in Motion: Mapping Key Contacts and Their Imprints in World History (2001) Feminist Cyberscapes: Mapping Gendered Academic Spaces (1999) A Geography of Victorian Gothic Fiction: Mapping History’s Nightmares (1999) Literature, Mapping, and The Politics of Space in Early Modern Britain (2001) Mapping African America: History, Narrative Formation, and the Production of Knowledge (1999) Mapping Canadian Cultural Space: Essays on Canadian Literature (2000) Mapping Jewish Identities (2000) Mapping Male Sexuality: Nineteenth-Century England (2000) Mapping Memories: Urdu Stories from India and Pakistan (1998) Mapping Modernities: Geographies of Central and Eastern Europe, 1920-2000 (2002) Mapping Subaltern Studies and the Postcolonial (2000) Mapping the Empty: Eight Artists and Nevada (1999) Mapping the Ethical Turn: A Reader in Ethics, Culture, and Literary Theory (2001) Mapping the Present: Heidegger, Foucault, and the Project of a Spatial History (2001) Mapping the Sacred: Religion, Geography and Postcolonial Literatures (2001) Odysseys Home: Mapping African-Canadian Literature (2002) Orientations: Mapping Studies in the Asian Diaspora (2001) And last but not least: What Remains to be Discovered: Mapping the Secrets of the Universe, the Origins of Life, and the Future of the Human Race (1998) Even this selective list reveals a pervasive conjunction between the charting of space and the charting of knowledge, suggesting a link between the turn to spatial tropes and our increasingly globalized consciousness of the world. Yet oddly enough, while humanists and cultural critics have turned to the trope of mapping, geographers have been launching their most fundamental critiques of traditional cartographic practices. As Neil Smith and Cindi Katz point out, the discipline of geography was founded on assumptions of absolute space—“space as field or container, describable by a two-or three-dimensional metric of co-ordinates” (74). And the problem is that, although literary and cultural analyses increasingly recognize the fluidity, relationality, and multiplicity of the experiencing subject, the recent turn to geographic metaphor marks an uneasy gap between the destabilized subject and a discourse of spatial essentialism: “‘Space’ itself is rendered unproblematic, in startling contrast to the ‘everything flows’ of the social” (79). As Smith and Katz argue, since space itself is socially constructed and therefore as fluid and dynamic as the travelling subject, a slippage occurs between the material ground, or the “source domain,” and the metaphorical dimension, or the “target domain.” (69). Despite the multiplicity of locations being charted, the objective practices of surveying, circumscribing, and recording inscribe the notion of intellectual territorial mastery. Indeed, Smith and Katz speculate that it may be the extraordinary disruption and dispersion of previous knowledges and assumptions that occasions the turn to a non-problematized discourse: “space is largely exempted from such sceptical scrutiny precisely so it can be held constant to provide some semblance of order for an otherwise floating world of ideas” (80). Increasingly, however, the breakdown of absolute notions of space is transforming traditional cartographic practices. Despite Baudrillard’s concept of simulacra with its implication that “it is the map that engenders the territory” (166), it is equally true that new or previously unobserved spatial relations demand new strategies for mapping, with the boomerang effect that the new strategies in turn stimulate new spatial imaginings. Without denying Baudrillard’s insight that fabrication produces the observable real, we can also recognize the real as what intercedes in our fabricating, exposing the limitations of existing languages and stimulating reformulations of our fabrications. If globalization transforms the nature of spatial relations, then new mapping strategies are needed to depict those relations, and the strategies themselves will then prompt further reflection on the nature and conditions of our knowledge. To return, then, to the question of imaging globalization, we might describe the current predicament as one of employing a language inflected with territorialized constructions of space to express the complicated and shifting spatial dynamics of a deterritorialized globe. Again with recourse to geographers, we might say that an older, geopolitical language is being employed, with some hazards and difficulty, to track the complex processes of globalization. This distinction, I must emphasize, rests on a historical definition of the first term. Today “geopolitics” is often used to signify any locational approach to political issues or any political understanding of space, but the term as first introduced bore the specific connotation of location as territorially framed. Geopolitik was coined in 1899 by the Swedish political scientist Rudolf Kjellén, who—building on the work of German geographer Freidrich Ratzel—used the term to signify a Darwinian understanding of state power as dependent on territorial growth: stronger organisms survive by displacing the weaker. Although Kjellén’s theories had perhaps their greatest influence on the ideology that informed Nazi Germany, the geopolitical model is taken to be the dominant paradigm in the West until the end of the Cold War, fulfilling Halford Makinder’s prediction, in 1904, that the struggle for world power would focus on territorial control of Eurasia. As geographer Brian Blouet points out, geopolitics is a land-based ideology; it locates power in territorial magnitude and makes its goal the carving up of earth’s space. In contrast, Blouet identifies globalization as originally a maritime-based ideology deriving in large part from the Dutch; it offers an open rather than closed space paradigm, locating power in movement rather than bounded territory. It is important to note that the contrast is not one of bad geopolitics versus good globalization; both paradigms are subject to imperialist cooption. As Ian Baucom has recently shown, the Dutch seaborne empire was inherently imperialist; more immediately, although it may be helpful to describe the cartography of globalization as mapping fluidities, today even water threatens to become an article of imperialist control.2 But the geopolitical paradigm shifts to that of globalization as the world becomes increasingly based on the international or global circulation of capital, information, goods, and services, and the operative model shifts from bounded space to multi-directional flows.

#### Our Alt: We can defend the rest of their advocacy and negate only certain parts. 2NR consolidation is the best alt:

#### One – no plan means any part of the 1AC can become the nexus question by the 2AR, we should reciprocally get to conditionally critique their frames and narrow the debate to parts of disagreement by the 2NR.

#### Two – – Praxis: our model teaches a form of engagement that corrects flaws in political strategies. Rejecting our approach is normatively worse for the Aff’s own cause.

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Freddie DeBoer makes a great point in his piece on what he calls “critique drift“: “This all largely descends from a related condition: many in the broad online left have adopted a norm where being an ally means that you never critique people who are presumed to be speaking from your side, and especially if they are seen as speaking from a position of greater oppression. I understand the need for solidarity, I understand the problem of undermining and derailing, and I recognize why people feel strongly that those who have traditionally been silenced should be given a position of privilege in our conversations. B(b)ut critique drift demonstrates why a healthy, functioning political movement can’t forbid tactical criticism of those with whom you largely agree. Because critical vocabulary and political arguments are common intellectual property which gain or lose power based on their communal use, never criticizing those who misuse them ultimately disarms (hampers) the left. Refusing to say ‘*this* is a real thing, but you are not being fair or helpful in making *that* accusation right now’ alienates potential allies, contributes to the burgeoning backlash against social justice politics, and prevents us from making the most accurate, cogent critique possible.” ----- (Williams is now no longer quoting DeBoer) Look, I am Black. Also, sometimes, I can be wrong. Those two things are not mutually exclusive, and yet we have gotten to a point where any critique of tactics used by oppressed communities can result in being deemed “sexist/racist/insert oppression here-ist” and cast out of the Social Justice Magic Circle. And listen, maybe that is cool with some folks. Maybe the revolution that so many of these types speak about will simply consist of everyone spontaneously coming to consciousness and there will be no need for coalitions, give-and-take, or contact with people who do not know every word or phrase that these groups use as some sort of litmus test for the unwashed. But for the rest of us who reside in a reality-based world, where every social interaction is not tailored for your idiosyncratic indignations, we know that casting folks out for the tiniest of offenses will lead to a Left that will forever be marginalized and ineffective. I have stated before that the kind of people who put out these lists and engage in the kind of identitarian caterwauling that has become rote copy on the Internet might actually want that, as a world where left-wing activism is made potent and transformative will be one where they cannot simply take comfort in their cocoon of self-righteousness. But damn them when I can turn on my computer and ~~see~~ one Black person after another being gunned down by police. Damn them when we have a president that can sit there with a straight face and speak the words of freedom and liberation while using the power at his disposal to deny those very concepts to others. And damn them when we can get thousands of words on Patricia Arquette drunk at a party or how it is privileged to not like the same musicians that they do, but we cannot seem to get any thoughts on how the biggest moment for communities of color since the 1960s is being squandered in a hail of intergenerational squabbling. And do not even get me started on people writing articles that malign long-standing activist organizations without a whiff of evidence that there has been any wrongdoing on their part.

#### Three – contingent agreement is good: negating the whole aff makes only the most extreme stances strategic, like prejudice is good. We should debate framing strategies rather than impact turns to injustice

#### Four – its fair: frame subtraction auto gives the aff ground – just defend the stances of the 1AC. All our links are net benefits to this Alt and it applies to other frames that we’ve critiqued.

## FW

#### Interpretation – affirmative teams should have to defend hypothetical implementation of topical plan that increases prohibitions of anti-competitive business practices by the private sector by at least expanding the scope of core antitrust laws.

#### 1—“Core antitrust laws” are the Sherman, Clayton, and FTC Acts.

Boyce 21 - (\*Sonia Pfaffenroth, \*\*Justin Hedge, and \*\*\*Monique Boyce; \*formerly Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Civil and Criminal Operations @ the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice’s now legal Partner @ Arnold & Porter \*\*Antitrust Counsel @ Arnold & Porter \*\*\*Senior Associate @ Arnold & Porter; published 2021, Arnold & Porter, "EC’s Reinterpretation of EUMR Article 22 Increases Enforcement Risk for Small Transactions," 8-21-2021) url: https://www.arnoldporter.com/-/media/files/perspectives/publications/2021/06/the-antitrust-counselor--june-2021--aba-als-corp-c.pdf

At the federal level, there are three core antitrust laws: (1) the Sherman Act, in which Section 1 outlaws “every contract, combination, or conspiracy in [unreasonable] restraint of trade,” and Section 2 outlaws any “monopolization, attempted monopolization, or conspiracy or combination to monopolize”;1 (2) the Federal Trade Commission Act, which prohibits “unfair methods of competition” and “unfair or deceptive acts or practices”;2 and (3) Section 7 of the Clayton Act, which prohibits mergers and acquisitions where the effect “may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.”3 Criminal violations of the Sherman Act carry a maximum penalty of a $100 million fine for corporations, and a maximum penalty of 10 years in prison and a $1 million fine for individuals. A prevailing plaintiff in a civil suit can recover treble damages and attorneys’ fees. But federal law currently does not provide for civil penalties when the government brings an antitrust case, only injunctive relief.

#### 2—“Prohibition” is a legal restriction.

Duhaime’s Law Dictionary N.D. –  Referred to by the Oxford University law library (Bodleian), School of Law, University of Oxford, Oxford, England, as a recommended research resource for law students (“Prohibition Definition”, Duhaime’s Law Dictionary, <https://www.duhaime.org/Legal-Dictionary/Term/Prohibition>, No Date)

Prohibition Definition:

A legal restriction against the use of something or against certain conduct.

#### Violation – the aff doesn’t defend the end point of increasing prohibitions that expand the scope of core antitrust laws

#### Prefer our interpretation:

#### 1---Fairness – the aff interp destroys it – not requiring a plan text decks stasis by allowing aff teams to change the 1AC throughout the debate, explodes the burden of negative research by unlimiting it to anything tangentially related to the resolution, and nullifies all topic-specific neg prep by forcing teams to rely on concessionary ground

#### 2---Truth Testing – only a topic with predictable limits produces clash-filled debates, which is the only internal link to any benefit debate can offer – rigorously testing positions allows debaters to improve their own advocacies and how to defend them, which creates more ethical and effective worldviews – but that becomes impossible without specific resolutional ties

#### Our model of debate doesn’t trade off with personal convictions, but it does make debaters stronger advocates

**Hodson**, professor of education – Ontario Institute for Studies @ University of Toronto, **‘9**

(Derek, “Towards an Action-oriented Science Curriculum,” Journal for Activist Science & Technology Education, Vol. 1, No. 1)

\*\*note: SSI = socioscientific issues

Politicization of science education can be achieved by giving students the opportunity to confront real world issues that have a scientific, technological or environmental dimension. By grounding content in socially and personally relevant contexts, an issues-based approach can provide the motivation that is absent from current abstract, de-contextualized approaches and can form a base from which students can construct understanding that is personally relevant, meaningful and important. It can provide increased opportunities for active learning, inquiry-based learning, collaborative learning and direct experience of the situatedness and multidimensionality of scientific and technological practice. In the Western contemporary world, technology is all pervasive; its social and environmental impact is clear; its disconcerting social implications and disturbing moral-ethical dilemmas are made apparent almost every day in popular newspapers, TV news bulletins and Internet postings. In many ways, it is much easier to recognize how technology is determined by the sociocultural context in which it is located than to see how science is driven by such factors. It is much easier to see the environmental impact of technology than to see the ways in which science impacts on society and environment. For these kinds of reasons, it makes good sense to use problems and issues in technology and engineering as the major vehicles for contextualizing the science curriculum. This is categorically not an argument against teaching science; rather, it is an argument for teaching the science that informs an understanding of everyday technological problems and may assist students in reaching tentative solutions about where they stand on key SSI.

#### Framework has to be a voting issue – integrity of the game is a precondition for voting, and we’ve all implicitly agreed fairness is good by abiding by other norms like speech times and order – not voting for fairness causes judge biases which are worse

#### All arguments are framework arguments---exclusion args rely on a false dichotomy because debate requires continual judgment about which arguments are persuasive and which can be dismissed even though this usually happens implicitly---the role of the negative is always to say that it was bad for the aff to say what they did--- we don’t have the power to impose a norm, only to persuade you that their argumentative practices should be rejected

Amanda Anderson 6, Andrew W. Mellon Professor of Humanities and English at Brown University, Spring 2006, “Reply to My Critic(s),” Criticism, Vol. 48, No. 2, p. 281-290

Lets first examine the claim that my book is "unwittingly" inviting a resurrection of the "Enlightenment-equals-totalitarianism position." How, one wonders, could a book promoting argument and debate, and promoting reason-giving practices as a kind of common ground that should prevail over assertions of cultural authenticity, somehow come to be seen as a dangerous resurgence of bad Enlightenment? Robbins tells us why: I want "argument on my own terms"-that is, I want to impose reason on people, which is a form of power and oppression. But what can this possibly mean? Arguments stand or fall based on whether they are successful and persuasive, even an argument in favor of argument. It simply is not the case that an argument in favor of the importance of reasoned debate to liberal democracy is tantamount to oppressive power. To assume so is to assume, in the manner of Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, that reason is itself violent, inherently, and that it will always mask power and enforce exclusions. But to assume this is to assume the very view of Enlightenment reason that Robbins claims we are "thankfully" well rid of. (I leave to the side the idea that any individual can proclaim that a debate is over, thankfully or not.) But perhaps Robbins will say, "I am not imagining that your argument is directly oppressive, but that what you argue for would be, if it were enforced." Yet my book doesn't imagine or suggest it is enforceable; I simply argue in favor of, I promote, an ethos of argument within a liberal democratic and proceduralist framework. As much as Robbins would like to think so, neither I nor the books I write can be cast as an arm of the police. Robbins wants to imagine a far more direct line of influence from criticism to political reality, however, and this is why it can be such a bad thing to suggest norms of argument. Watch as the gloves come off: Faced with the prospect of submitting to her version of argument roughly, Habermass version-and of being thus authorized to disagree only about other, smaller things, some may feel that there will have been an end to argument, or an end to the arguments they find most interesting. With current events in mind, I would be surprised if there were no recourse to the metaphor of a regular army facing a guerilla insurrection, hinting that Anderson wants to force her opponents to dress in uniform, reside in well-demarcated camps and capitals that can be bombed, fight by the rules of states (whether the states themselves abide by these rules or not), and so on-in short, that she wants to get the battle onto a terrain where her side will be assured of having the upper hand. Lets leave to the side the fact that this is a disowned hypothetical criticism. (As in, "Well, okay, yes, those are my gloves, but those are somebody elses hands they will have come off of.") Because far more interesting, actually, is the sudden elevation of stakes. It is a symptom of the sorry state of affairs in our profession that it plays out repeatedly this tragicomic tendency to give a grandiose political meaning to every object it analyzes or confronts. We have evidence of how desperate the situation is when we see it in a critic as thoughtful as Bruce Robbins, where it emerges as the need to allegorize a point about an argument in such a way that it gets cast as the equivalent of war atrocities. It is especially ironic in light of the fact that to the extent that I do give examples of the importance of liberal democratic proceduralism, I invoke the disregard of the protocols of international adjudication in the days leading up to the invasion of Iraq; I also speak about concerns with voting transparency. It is hard for me to see how my argument about proceduralism can be associated with the policies of the Bush administration when that administration has exhibited a flagrant disregard of democratic procedure and the rule of law. I happen to think that a renewed focus on proceduralism is a timely venture, which is why I spend so much time discussing it in my final chapter. But I hasten to add that I am not interested in imagining that proceduralism is the sole political response to the needs of cultural criticism in our time: my goal in the book is to argue for a liberal democratic culture of argument, and to suggest ways in which argument is not served by trumping appeals to identity and charismatic authority. I fully admit that my examples are less political events than academic debates; for those uninterested in the shape of intellectual arguments, and eager for more direct and sustained discussion of contemporary politics, the approach will disappoint. Moreover, there will always be a tendency for a proceduralist to under-specify substance, and that is partly a principled decision, since the point is that agreements, compromises, and policies get worked out through the communicative and political process. My book is mainly concentrated on evaluating forms of arguments and appeals to ethos, both those that count as a form of trump card or distortion, and those that flesh out an understanding of argument as a universalist practice. There is an intermittent appeal to larger concerns in the political democratic culture, and that is because I see connections between the ideal of argument and the ideal of deliberative democracy. But there is clearly, and indeed necessarily, significant room for further elaboration here. There is a way to make Robbins’s point more narrowly which would run something like this: Anderson has a very restricted notion of how argument should play out, or appear, within academic culture, given the heavy emphasis on logical consistency and normative coherence and explicitness. This conception of argument is too narrow (and hence authoritarian). To this I would reply simply that logical consistency and normative coherence and explicitness do not exhaust the possible forms, modes, and strategies of argumentation. There is a distinction to be made between the identification of moves that stultify or disarm argument, and an insistence on some sort of single manner of reasoned argument. The former I am entirely committed to; the latter not at all, despite the fact that I obviously favor a certain style of argument, and even despite the fact that I am philosophically committed to the claims of the theory of communicative reason. I do address the issue of diverse forms and modes of argument in the first and last chapters of the book (as I discuss above), but it seems that a more direct reflection on the books own mode of argumentation might have provided the occasion for a fuller treatment of the issues that trouble Robbins. Different genres within academe have different conventions, of course, and we can and do make decisions all the time about what rises to the level of cogency within specific academic venues, and what doesn't. Some of those judgments have to do with protocols of argument. The book review, for example, is judged according to whether the reviewer responsibly represents the scholarship under discussion, seems to have a good grasp of the body of scholarship it belongs to, and convincingly and fairly points out strengths and weaknesses. The book forum is a bit looser-one expects responsible representation of the scholarship under discussion, but it can be more selectively focused on a key set of issues. And one expects a bit of provocation, in order to make the exchange readable and dramatic. But of course in a forum exchange there is an implicit norm of argument, a tendency to judge whether a particular participant is making a strong or a weak case in light of the competing claims at play. Much of our time in the profession is taken with judging the quality of all manner of academic performance, and much of it has to do with norms of argument, however much Robbins may worry about their potentially coercive nature.

### New Affs Bad

New affs are a voting issue-

1) destroys education- we don’t get in depth research or understanding of the affirmative to engage the affirmative.

2) Fairness- new affs undercut our ability to receive coaching and force the neg to read generic. The aff will always control link specifics and spin, means the neg will inevitably lose. Our interpretation is that they can read new affs as long as they disclose what they are- solves all the offense

# On

#### Injection of the 1ac into debate recreates their impacts

**Mbembe 16** (achille mbembe is a god-tier theorist, and senior researcher at the institute of social and economic research at the university of the witwatersrand. “the age of humanism is ending”, <https://mg.co.za/article/2016-12-22-00-the-age-of-humanism-is-ending/> mail & guardian) Rshad-RZA

Under Israeli occupation for decades, Gaza will still be the biggest open prison on Earth. In the United States, the killing of black people at the hands of the police will proceed unabated and hundreds of thousands more will join those already housed in the prison-industrial complex that came on the heels of plantation slavery and Jim Crow laws. Europe will continue its slow descent into liberal authoritarianism or what cultural theorist Stuart Hall called authoritarian populism. Despite complex agreements reached at international forums, the ecological destruction of the Earth will continue and the war on terror will increasingly morph into a war of extermination between various forms of nihilism. Inequalities will keep growing worldwide. But far from fuelling a renewed cycle of class struggles, social conflicts will increasingly take the form of racism, ultranationalism, sexism, ethnic and religious rivalries, xenophobia, homophobia and other deadly passions. The denigration of virtues such as care, compassion and kindness will go hand in hand with the belief, especially among the poor, that winning is all that matters and who wins — by whatever means necessary — is ultimately right. With the triumph of this neo-Darwinian approach to history-making, apartheid under various guises will be restored as the new old norm. Its restoration will pave the way to new separatist impulses, the erection of more walls, the militarisation of more borders, deadly forms of policing, more asymmetrical wars, splitting alliances and countless internal divisions including in established democracies. None of the above is accidental. If anything, it is a symptom of structural shifts, which will become ever more apparent as the new century unfolds. The world as we knew it since the end of World War II, the long years of decolonisation, the Cold War and the defeat of communism has ended. Another long and deadlier game has started. The main clash of the first half of the 21st century will not oppose religions or civilisations. It will oppose liberal democracy and neoliberal capitalism, the rule of finance and the rule of the people, humanism and nihilism. Capitalism and liberal democracy triumphed over fascism in 1945 and over communism in the early 1990s when the Soviet Union collapsed. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the advent of globalisation, their fates were disentangled. The widening bifurcation of democracy and capital is the new threat to civilisation. Abetted by technological and military might, finance capital has achieved its hegemony over the world by annexing the core of human desires and, in the process, by turning itself into the first global secular theology. Fusing the attributes of a technology and a religion, it relied on uncontested dogmas modern forms of capitalism had reluctantly shared with democracy since the post-war period — individual liberty, market competition and the rule of the commodity and of property, the cult of science, technology and reason. Each of these articles of faith is under threat. At its core, liberal democracy is not compatible with the inner logic of finance capitalism. The clash between these two ideas and principles is likely to be the most signifying event of the first half of a 21st-century political landscape — a landscape shaped less by the rule of reason than by the general release of passions, emotions and affect. In this new landscape, knowledge will be defined as knowledge for the market. The market itself will be re-imagined as the primary mechanism for the validation of truth. As markets themselves are increasingly turning into algorithmic structures and technologies, the only useful knowledge will be algorithmic. Instead of people with body, history and flesh, statistical inferences will be all that count. Statistics and other big data will mostly be derived from computation. As a result of the conflation of knowledge, technology and markets, contempt will be extended to anyone who has nothing to sell. The humanistic and Enlightenment notion of the rational subject capable of deliberation and choice will be replaced by the consciously deliberating and choosing consumer. Already in the making, a new kind of human will triumph. This will not be the liberal individual who, not so long ago, we believed could be the subject of democracy. The new human being will be constituted through and within digital technologies and computational media. The computational age — the age of Facebook, Instagram, Twitter — is dominated by the idea that there are clean slates in the unconscious. New media forms have not only lifted the lid previous cultural eras had put on the unconscious. They have become the new infrastructures of the unconscious. Yesterday, human sociality consisted of keeping tabs on the unconscious. For the social to thrive meant exercising vigilance on ourselves, or delegating to specific authorities the right to enforce such vigilance. This was called repression. Repression’s main function was to set the conditions for sublimation. Not all desires could be fulfilled. Not everything could be said or enacted. The capacity to limit oneself was the essence of one’s freedom and the freedom of all. Partly thanks to new media forms and the post-repressive era it has unleashed, the unconscious can now roam free. Sublimation is no longer necessary. Language has been dislocated. The content is in the form and the form is beyond, or in excess of, the content. We are now led to believe that mediation is no longer necessary. This explains the growing anti-humanist stance that now goes hand in hand with a general contempt for democracy. Calling this phase of our history fascist might be misleading unless by fascism we mean the normalisation of a social state of warfare. Such a state would in itself be a paradox because, if anything, warfare leads to the dissolution of the social. And yet under conditions of neoliberal capitalism, politics will become a barely sublimated warfare. This will be a class warfare that denies its very nature — a war against the poor, a race war against minorities, a gender war against women, a religious war against Muslims, a war against the disabled. Neoliberal capitalism has left in its wake a multitude of destroyed subjects, many of whom are deeply convinced that their immediate future will be one of continuous exposure to violence and existential threat. They genuinely long for a return to some sense of certainty, the sacred, hierarchy, religion and tradition. They believe that nations have become akin to swamps that need to be drained and the world as it is should be brought to an end. For this to happen, everything should be cleansed off. They are convinced that they can only be saved in a violent struggle to restore their masculinity, the loss of which they attribute to the weaker among them, the weak they do not want to become. In this context, the most successful political entrepreneurs will be those who convincingly speak to the losers, to the destroyed men and women of globalisation and to their ruined identities. In the street fight politics will become, reason will not matter. Nor will facts. Politics will revert into brutal survivalism in an ultracompetitive environment. Under such conditions, the future of progressive and future-oriented mass politics of the left is very uncertain. In a world set on objectifying everybody and every living thing in the name of profit, the erasure of the political by capital is the real threat. The transformation of the political into business raises the risk of the elimination of the very possibility of politics. Whether civilisation can give rise at all to any form of political life is the problem of the 21st century.